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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
employer or principal and prescribes the terms of its contract with its employees
and agents, and those statutes in which it attempts to regulate contracts be-
tween private individuals. These latter clearly come within the constitutional
prohibition, and are well illustrated in Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 60 L. Ed. 131.
All the cases holding that such a statute is constitutional point out that some
public purpose must be served by the restriction and that the legislature is the
judge of the wisdom of the restriction. The cases on both sides agree that the
restriction cannot be justified under the police power, as public safety, morality,
or convenience is not involved.
It would seem that Tennessee had but followed a line of authority, which if
not unanimous, is of respectable authority. W. T. '27.
CONTEMPT-POWER OF SENATE TO PUNISH FoR.-This was an appeal by de-
fendant, McGrain, from a judgment of a district court discharging in a habeas
corpus proceeding a witness attached by order of the Senate for refusal to af-
tend and give evidence before a Senate investigating committee. The witness,
Daugherty, had been subpoenaed by a committee appointed to investigate the
department of justice and upon his refusal to appear had been held under pro-
cess of attachment by defendant, a deputy sergeant-at-arms of the Senate;
thence followed the habeas corpus proceeding, its decision, and this appeal.
Held, that the power of inquiry with its incident powers to subpoena and com-
pel the attendance of witnesses is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function and as such is impliedly conferred upon the Senate by the
constitution of the United States which expressly confers the power to legislate
and hence the lower court's order discharging the witness was reversed, Mc-
Grain v. Daugherty, (U. S., 1927) 71 L. Ed. 371.
The power of the Senate or any legislative bodies to punish for contempt is
one which has been regularly exercised for some time. Such a power was
used by the British Parliament and in our colonial legislatures before the
American Revolution; also in both Houses and in most of the state legislatures.
UNIV. OF PENN. LAW REVIEW, Vol. 74, No. 7, p. 691 and No. 8 p. 780. (This
article by Prof. Potts gives a rather extended and very able comment upon the
Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt, both from a historical and
a legal viewpoint.) As to the exercise of this power there is little, if any,
doubt, but as to the legality of such exercise we must look further. English au-
thority on this subject is of little value to us since their use of the writ of
habeas corpus is a great deal more limited than ours in matters pertaining to
action by Parliament. Our state courts, including Missouri, quite generally have
held that the power to legislate carries with it by necessary implication ample
authority to obtain information needed in the rightful exercise of that power
and to employ compulsory power process for that purpose, Burnham v. Morrisey,
14 Gray 226, 239, 74 Am. Dec. 676; Wilckens v. Willet, 40 N. Y. (1 Keyes) 521,
525; State ex rel Rosenheimr v. Frear, 138 Wis. 173, 119 N. W. 894; Lowe v.
Summers, 69 Mo. App. 637, 649, 650. Besides the above state decisions, there
are four outstanding findings of the U. S. Sup. Court on the point involved in
this case. In the first, a plea of justification by the sergeant-at-arms of the
House in an action of trespass against him was held good, the court saying that
the House has power to attach and punish a person other than a member for
contempt of its authority, namely, an attempt to bribe one of its members,
Anderson z. Dunn (1827), 6 Wheat. 204, 5 L. Ed. 242. In the second case, and
one which has proved somewhat of a thorn in the side of proponents of the
power in question, a plea of justification similar to that in the previous case
was held not good, the court saying that the House did not have jurisdiction to
make the particular inquiry and hence had no authority to imprison one Kilbourn,
for refusal to testify at such inquiry; note that the court did not deny the
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existence of the power to punish for contempt but rather its proper application
in this case, Kilbourn v. Thompson (1880), 103 U. S. 168, 26 L. Ed. 377. Next
in order was the famous Chapman case, where the court denied a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus to relieve the petitioner from restraint under a judgment
convicting him under a statute for refusal to answer, saying that the Senate
did have power to punish for contempt a recusant witness and that inquiry
into the Senate's motives in making the investigation, whether for future legis-
lative action or what, was neither necessary nor proper. Re Chapman, (1897)
166 U. S. 661, 41 L. Ed. 1154. The latest case prior to the instant one was
decided in 1917 and was an appeal from a decision of a district court to review
an order refusing relief by habeas corpus to the appellant who had been taken
in custody; the court held that the action of a person in sending an irritating
letter to the chairman of one of the committees of the House respecting its
action and purposes was not such an act of contempt as to be punishable; again,
this is no denial of the power but rather a decision as to its improper application
to the circumstances in hand, Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 61 L. Ed. 881.
Thus, it can be seen that never has the power been denied but the courts have at
very infrequent times seen fit to deny it proper application mainly because of
the peculiar facts and situations arising in those particular cases. Judging by
the foregoing, one is practically forced to the conclusion, both because of logic
and precedent, that legislative bodies should be and are invested with the power
to punish contumacious witnesses for contempt and the enforcement of such
a power bids fair to raise the now extremely low number of men who have ever
been convicted of this misconduct. E. L. W. '28.
COURTS-CONTRACT RIGHTS AcQUIRED UNDER EXISTING STATE OF LAW NOT
DISTURBED BY CHANGE OF CONSTRUCTION IN SUBSEQUENT DEcisION.-Where land
was conveyed by deed which was recorded, but the name of one of the grantors
was not properly indexed by the recorder as required by statute, such convey-
ance was valid, a court decision at the time declaring that under existing law
improper indexing did not impair the efficacy of a deed, although this decision
was overruled before the action in the present case, by the court holding that
indexing was a necessary part of registration. Wilkinson et al. v. Wallace, 134
SE. 401.
This case involves one of the points that arose in the much criticised case of
Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175. In that case a city issued some bonds in aid of
a railroad, which bonds had been held valid by decisions of the state court at
the time the plaintiff acquired his rights. A later decision overruling the prior
decisions was held not to invalidate the bonds of the plaintiff in the Gelpcke
case. The criticism that has been levelled at the doctrine of such cases is that
a contract is created by the court decision, from which position the court could
never withdraw without violating contract rights. The weight of authority,
however, and the sounder rule seems to be that, " . . .if the contract when
made was valid by the laws of the state as then expounded by all departments
of the government, and administered in its courts of justice, its validity and
obligation cannot be impaired by any subsequent action of legislation or de-
cision of its courts altering the construction of the law." Ohio Life &' Trust
Co. v. Debolt, 16 Howard 432.
The defendant in the instant case, contends that the transaction here, occurred
prior to the first case, Davis v. Whitaker, 114 N. C. 279, construing the statute
under which the deed was made, not to mean that improper indexing would
invalidate the deed; and having occurred prior, in point of time to Davis v.
Whitaker, that case would not govern the transaction, but that the latest in-
terpretation of the statute should affect the holding in his case. The latest
interpretation of the statute was that improper indexing invalidated the deed,
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